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The purpose of this project is to demonstrate that the economic analysis of the law should 
proceed from the notion that individuals form a spontaneous order in response to the institution 
of tort law, each other, and their environment.  First, I address the methodological advantages of 
the emergent framework over that of the mainstream neoclassical position, as well as assess the 
Austrian contribution.  I then attempt to reconcile agent-based modeling with the common 
methodological concerns.  I subsequently attempt to demonstrate the efficacy of agent based 
modeling as an analytical tool that exploits its dynamic capabilities and develop an artificial 
society in which virtual agents endowed with varying attributes pursue productive, though 
inherently accident prone activity.  The accidents are chance encounters and engaging in 
behavior that reduces the likelihood of accidents is costly.  I consider the typical questions 
researchers working within the neoclassical tradition tend to pursue such as analysis of the 
relative benefits of strict liability and negligence.  However, I also highlight that the agent-based 
approach is also useful in inspiring and answering wide ranges of questions that the neoclassical 
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I.  Introduction 
 
 It is appropriate that scholars working within the Austrian tradition would bring a unique 
perspective to economic analysis of the law, considering the school’s founding fathers such as 
Carl Menger, Ludwig von Mises and Frederich Hayek all received their doctorates in law.  These 
scholars are credited with creating a well developed theory of the market process (see for 
example Mises 1996; Hayek, 1948; Kirzner, 1973) and spontaneous order (Hayek, 1973) that 
serves as a methodological alternative to the mainstream neoclassical paradigm.  It is the purpose 
of this essay to more fully exploit the insights of spontaneous order economics and apply them to 
the economic analysis of accident law.  Through the course of this endeavor, I examine the 
suitability of agent based simulation as a tool towards this end.   
 The typical neoclassical analysis proceeds by imposing equilibrium upon the phenomena 
under examination and deducing the behavior of the individual actors that sustains that 
equilibrium.  As an alternative, I argue that examining the law through the lens of spontaneous 
order economics gains substantial insight and can illuminate important characteristics that are 
often overlooked in the mainstream neoclassical theorizing.  In addition, a gap is identified in the 
Austrian literature on accident law and an attempt is made to shore up what has heretofore been 
overlooked.  I leverage the notion that many social phenomena are best understood as 
spontaneous orders.  For example, Rizzo (1980) argues the static General Equilibrium construct 
underlying the neoclassical analysis of accident law is an inappropriate method to analyze a 
dynamic system constantly in a state of flux.   He questions the usefulness of such concepts as 
“least cost avoider” and “last clear chance” and ultimately undermines neoclassical notions of 
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common law efficiency.  I also draw from Wagner (2007) and argue in favor of a conjunctive 
view of society, as opposed to a teleological disjunctive perspective. 
 I then explain the manner in which agent-based modeling is consistent and 
complementary to Austrian theory and finally I provide an example of employing an agent-based 
computational model in the analysis of accident law.  I present the situation faced by the 
inhabitants of Eggtopia, a fictitious society whose members search for and collect precious eggs.  
In the course of their productive efforts they occasionally experience destructive accidents with 
other individuals.  The inhabitants face trade-offs in that engaging in behavior that increases their 
productivity may also increase the possibility of an accident.  I demonstrate how the agent-based 
model of Eggtopian society developed in this paper can be used to answer the questions 
commonly addressed in the mainstream literature.  The efficiency of various liability regimes is 
one such thread of analysis.    Other threads include the effects of systematic uncertainty 
regarding the extant judicial precedent or in the court’s ability to obtain the necessary 
information to appropriately apply the legal rule.  The analysis within the neoclassical 
framework revolves around the economic efficiency of various rules given certain extensions and 
complications.  The power of the evolutionary approach is not simply that it assists in developing 
a genetic-causal explanation as a means for determining the desirability of various liability rules, 
it is that the approach enables the exploration of population dynamics and a close examination of 
out of equilibrium behavior.  Among the realizations this framework yields is the notion that 
system level steady state does not necessarily imply agent level steady state, agents may elect to 
be careful even when the neoclassical theory predicts otherwise, and liability rules differ in their 
ability to rid society of negligent behavior.   
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 A search of the literature to find an agent-based simulation model applied to this aspect 
of economic analysis of tort law has proven unsuccessful.  Diianni (2007) has applied such 
techniques to model disputants and the evolution of precedent.  See also Yee (2005), and Picker 
(1997; 2002) for treatments on similar topics.  The current project is an attempt to remedy this 
gap.   
 
II.  A Brief Review of the Literature 
 
 What I refer to as Neoclassical Economics in this paper describes the metatheory within 
which most mainstream economists currently work.  Researchers working within this framework 
generally adhere to the following fundamental assumptions (Weintruab, 2008):  
 1.  People have rational preferences among outcomes. 
 2.  Individuals maximize utility and firms maximize profits. 
 3.  People act independently on the basis of full and relevant information.  
 
In “The Economic Approach to Human Behavior” (1976), Gary Becker states that the “combined 
assumptions of maximizing behavior, market equilibrium, and stable preferences, used 
relentlessly and unflinchingly, form the heart of the [neoclassical] economic approach (p.5).”  
While this approach is firmly embedded as the dominant mainstream paradigm, as other theorists 
would point out, namely the Austrians, this would come at the price of realism and conceptual 
clarity (see Boettke, 1997).  For the purposes of this discussion, we will concentrate on two of 
these methodological tenants, rational utility maximization and the use of equilibrium analysis.   
 Do individuals actually maximize utility?  Perhaps the more pertinent question is whether 
models that suggest they do are more useful and insightful than models that make the modest 
assertion that individuals merely economize between known choices.  One could rather easily list 
at least fifty different items to include in an ice cream sundae (ice cream flavors, toppings, 
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syrups, fruit, etc).  Choosing any five ingredients yields approximately 2.1 million different 
combinations of sundaes.  If one were to eat three different sundaes every day, it would take 
nearly two thousand years to exhaustively test every possibility and decisively determine one’s 
favorite.  This combinatoric critique highlights two separate but related limitations of human 
rationality in that human beings are neither able to collect nor cope with all of the information 
they are purported to possess and analyze as rational utility maximizers.  While the ice cream 
sundae example is certainly not a devastating critique of Max U, it begins to build the case that it 
is preferable to select mental models to organize thoughts on the basis of intelligibility as 
opposed to positivist predictability.  To that end, an emergent critique of the hyper-rational utility 
maximizer is to call into question just how individuals are able to negotiate the maze of nearly 
infinite combinations of means to effectively achieve the myriad ends they seek.  Individuals are 
only capable of selecting between means of which they are aware.  There may be other means 
that prove more fruitful if only brought to their attention.  From this perspective, entrepreneurs 
are seen as explorers of combinatoric space, providing maps to the previously uncharted universe 
of means-ends combinations.  
 Potts’ (2000) provides an enlightening critique of the foundations of neoclassic economic 
theory and attempts to unify the heterodox schools of thought under the umbrella of an 
evolutionary microeconomics.  He argues that: 
 
Underpinning all neowalrasian economic theory is the concept of the real field: 
Rn…  [I]n mathematics the real field is the generalization of arithmetic and the 
foundation of integral and differential calculus; one simply cannot do analysis 
without this concept….  And so from the marginal revolution onwards economics 
has appropriated this concept and … cemented it into the very foundations of the 
theoretical edifice.  The result is what passes for modern economic orthodoxy is a 
special application of field theory.  (p.11: citation omitted for clarity)  
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It is the notion of the field that underpins the fundamental assumptions of neoclassical 
economics.  It is ultimately why any recognizable version of choice, competition, and action 
disappear from general equilibrium theory; it is why time is homogenous and Newtonian in 
character; and information is always complete or otherwise known as a probability distribution.  
The field as a concept was borrowed from physics on the notion that it provided economic 
science with a measure of rigor that was previously missing from the classical theory.  While 
Potts is not the first theorist to identify the ontological and epistemic difference between physics 
and economics (for example, Mises 2006; Rothbard, 2004), he does provide an innovative graph 
theoretic foundation as an alternative.  He argues that connections or relationships among 
elements in the economic system are the important evolutionary variables of change, which is a 
notion that the field construct obscures. 
 Most importantly, the static nature of general equilibrium theorizing purges all concept of 
time from the model.  Time is a fundamental aspect of the market process as it has a profound 
effect on how individuals choose and act.  Action is unthinkable without time.  Since the future 
is unknowable, all choice – or action, takes place under a fog of uncertainty.  Individuals 
working within the market process constantly adjust their behaviors and strategies as a result of 
information that becomes revealed in the execution of the plans they have formulated.  As the 
plans of the entrepreneur come to fruition, she is able to measure her profit or loss, thus 
providing the ultimate criteria against which to measure the success of the plan formulated under 
the uncertain circumstances of the past. 
 Law and economics scholars in the neoclassical tradition, such as Landes and Posner 
(1981) typically develop an explicit mathematical function that describes the social welfare 
function for actors related to a particular type of accident (see Posner (1985), Shavell (1987), and 
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Cooter and Ulen (2007) for textbook treatments).  A representative injurer and a representative 
victim are selected to simplify the analysis and delineate the roles of the disputants.  The social 
welfare function for a default of no liability is constructed that ultimately embodies the notion 
that the overall costs of accidents include both the damages that occur as a result of physical 
accidents, as well as the costs of prevention.  The effects of various other liability rules are 
deduced from manipulations of the social welfare function.  Posner asserts that the judiciary 
should strive to select the liability rule that minimizes these costs for each situation.  In fact, his 
Positive Theory of Tort Law asserts that the common law with regard to tort has evolved through 
the generations as if judges, through their holdings, have attempted to minimize these accident 
costs (Landes and Posner, 1981). 
 
B.  A critique of Austrian Accident Law and Economics 
 
 Rizzo (1980; 1985) calls into question the application of typical neoclassical techniques, 
such as General Equilibrium analysis, to the realm of accident law due to the framework’s 
inability to appropriately handle the dynamic nature of this facet of society.  He demonstrates the 
hollowness of such doctrinal concepts as “least cost avoider” and “last clear chance”, among 
others.  As well he questions the court’s ability to calculate the social consequences of certain 
activity in light of the out-of-equilibrium prices that persist in the market (pp.309-310).  While 
Rizzo’s analysis culminates in the determination that the rule of strict liability is superior to the 
rule of negligence in terms of institutional efficiency, I refrain from judgment on this particular 
issue at this time.  I contend that Rizzo’s dissatisfaction for the neoclassical framework 
ultimately stems from his realization, though implicit, that the static neoclassical analysis is an 
inappropriate tool for the study of spontaneous orders.  A method that does not rely on static, 
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formal mathematical descriptions of behavior and instead embraces the dynamic nature of the 
system with outcomes that emerge as a result of individuals’ decentralized decision making 
would be superior and perhaps satisfy some of Rizzo’s criticisms.  Agent based computational 
modeling provides a powerful tool that allows a researcher to relax the general equilibrium 
assumptions, thus enabling greater realism while maintaining a tractable model.  The result is the 
ability to develop models of interest to social scientists that are recognizable reflections of reality 
and ultimately capable of enhancing understanding of complex phenomena.   
 Rothbard (1997, pp.121-170) though an important contribution to the Austrian literature, 
is essentially an effort to justify a natural rights perspective using praxeological arguments and as 
such, is largely orthogonal to the discussion in this project.  Beginning from his methodological 
origin of radical subjectivism and an ideological foundation in favor of strict property rights, he 
notes that intention is crucial in determining liability of an individual in a tort action.  He 
examines the case of Courvoisier v. Raymond (1896), wherein a man is threatened by an angry 
mob.  Another man emerges from the crowd and approaches the first.  In his anxious state, the 
first man feels threatened and exercises his right to defend his person by shooting the second, 
who unfortunately turned out to be a plain-clothed policeman attempting to offer assistance.  
Rothbard argues that because the policeman’s rights to security in his person were violated, the 
defendant should have been found strictly liable for damages.   
 Several other contributors from the Austrian School extend Rothbard’s arguments 
(Hoppe, 2004; Kinsella and Tinsley, 2004; Sechrest. 2004).  As far as genuine chance encounters 
are concerned, all tend to argue in favor of the rule of strict liability, for largely normative 
reasons.  However, the moral implications of various liability rules are outside the scope of this 
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project.  The model developed in this essay is meant to facilitate theorizing in an attempt to fill 
this gap with a more consequentialist perspective.   
 
III.  Law, Economics, and Spontaneous Order   
 
 Numerous researchers have noted that the body of laws that comprise the common law 
are the result of a spontaneous order (Hayek, 1973; Posner, 1972).  These laws have been 
modified incrementally for countless generations and evolved through an evolutionary process of 
hierarchical, yet decentralized attempts by various judges attempting to decide cases on the basis 
of general principles.  These laws also provide the foundation upon which the spontaneous order 
of society is built.  Abstract, purposeless, and equally applicable laws facilitate the generation of 
order from the bottom up, as individuals are encouraged to use their particular knowledge of time 
and place to their own advantage. Fehl highlights the dual levels upon which spontaneous order 
exists: 
To identify the legal and moral framework as an important prerequisite of the 
spontaneous order is an essential point.  As is well known, such ‘rules’ generate 
an order in themselves.  They enable the individual to make plans involving the 
interaction with other individuals, insofar as the execution of contracts can, in 
principle, be expected by the actors (Fehl, 1994, p.200). 
 
The institutions of private property and freedom of contract facilitate the spontaneous generation 
of the market and the emergence of the price mechanism.  Individuals refer to prices as guides in 
pursuit of profits, the existence of which is an indication that they have been successful in 
satisfying the most urgent demands of consumers, while the lack thereof is an indication of their 
failure.   
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 While certain institutions of the law enable the emergence of an explicit price mechanism 
through trade, i.e. certain facets of private property coupled with contract law, other legal 
institutions serve merely to impose an implicit price for particular behavior such as criminal or 
tort law.  For instance, the fact that the courts enforce a farmer’s property rights in his apples, as 
well as mutually agreed upon contracts that govern their exchange, ultimately enables a market 
for apples to emerge the outcome of which is a market price for a given quantity and quality of 
apples.  In contrast, the fact that the courts enforce a farmer’s property rights in his house by 
levying a punishment of, say, two years in prison for burglary means that potential burglars face 
an implicit price for engaging in such behavior.  They must weigh their perceived probability of 
getting caught and punished, by their subjective valuation of the magnitude of the punishment 
(Becker, 1976).  This section examines the characteristics of spontaneous orders that emerge as 
the result of such non-market decision making. 
 
A.  Accident Law and the Emergence of Spontaneous Order 
 
 Tort law governs interactions between strangers, such as chance encounter accidents, 
where circumstances prevent participants from reaching a contractual arrangement ex ante.  The 
law as handed down in the rulings of judges ultimately results in the emergence of an implicit 
price for engaging in risky behavior.  Individuals gauge the riskiness of their behavior in terms of 
damage suffered in the event of an accident, as well as an expectation of how the courts might 
assign liability.  Even if we assume that all participants know the exact liability rule in effect and 
all of its implications, the ultimate effects of the law upon the individual also depend upon the 
behavior of every other individual.  Even if, say negligence was set at a particular level of care, 
some individuals may decide upon a behavior whose perceived expected value may result in 
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either greater or less care, simply due to their unique preferences.  The process through which 
individuals compare their perceived expectations with objective reality is highly stochastic due to 
the variation and interdependence of all other agents and greatly complicates an agent’s ability to 
select behavior that achieves her desired outcome.  In this way an implicit price emerges as a 
result of human action, but not of human design, in a manner parallel to a market price.  So, just 
as the behavior of individuals engaging in market behavior may be considered a complex 
adaptive system, so may the interaction of individuals engaging in productive, yet accident prone 
activity.   
 There are two ways to conceptually frame the relationship between the judicial system 
and the individuals in society.  The first is the more common perspective of the state as a unitary 
being that stands outside of the market, and intervenes, as necessary to correct deficiencies.  
Wagner (2007) describes this as the disjunctive perspective.  It is disjunctive in the sense that the 
state is separate from the society of individuals that it governs.  In applying these notions to the 
economic analysis of the law, the implication is that disjunctive analysis treats the judiciary as a 
monolithic organization that pursues goals with singular focus.  The alternative paradigm is a 
conjunctive perspective, which acknowledges that even the state exhibits the qualities of a 
spontaneous order as opposed to an organization.  "Within the framework of a conjunctive 
political economy, the state is not a sentient being that intervenes into the market, but rather is an 
institutionalized process or forum within which people interact with one another (Wagner, 2007, 
p.14).”  In Wagner's analysis, there exists a market square for private transactions, and a public 
square for collective transactions where private property and residual claimancy is simply absent 
or attenuated.  Individuals who seek to start an enterprise may select either forum to build the 
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necessary relationships.  In this view, the courts are simply another forum that resides in the 
public square.   
 A disjunctive analysis of tort law identifies the presence of externalities and market 
failure that give rise to disputes, such as the fact that people might drive too fast and impose too 
high a threat of accidents upon others.  They recognize that the existence of transactions costs 
form a barrier to bargaining between accident disputants ex ante.  So, it is incumbent upon the 
judiciary to decide matters such that the efficient outcome obtains and teleologically impose 
decisions or policy towards that end.  Along the spectrum of concepts that range from the 
teleological to spontaneous, the interaction of the judiciary and those governed does lend itself to 
a teleological explanation from a certain perspective.  An indifferent judge stands outside the 
case at hand and decides on matters of fact and matters of law that have repercussions to the 
individuals in society at large.  Indeed, in much economic research, the institutions of private 
property, freedom of contract, and law of torts are assumed to work flawlessly and are relegated 
to the background.  In neoclassical law and economics, the judiciary is seen as an independent 
body that intervenes as necessary to fine tune the rules governing the interactions of individuals 
such that society's wealth is maximized.   
 However, there are some characteristics of the law that are illumined from taking a more 
conjunctive perspective.  The conjunctive view of the legal world embraces the notion that 
society is not a fully connected graph such that each element is connected to all others.  While a 
single judge might reach a decision and set a precedent, that judge’s power to actively change 
society is limited, because laws as handed down in judicial decisions still require the general 
consent or adherence of those to whom the law applies.  In other words, judges should not expect 
the decisions they pass down to garner unquestioning obedience from all affected individuals.  In 
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a Hayekian sense, a judge’s ruling in a case is not a command to an organization in the same way 
that a military leader commands his subordinates, but rather it helps form the rules of conduct 
that individuals consider before ultimately deciding upon a course of action suitable to meet their 
unique goals. 
 In addition, since judges often must rely on members of the executive branch of 
government to enforce the ruling, their ability to craft decisions to fully correct the deficiencies 
they perceive is even more attenuated.  Finally, a judge’s ruling might also be overturned on 
appeal; so many judges confine their decisions so as to limit the likelihood of being overturned.  
A main theme of this paper not only highlights the difficulties judges face when attempting to 
determine the wealth maximizing liability rule, but also the difficulty in anticipating how the 
individuals that comprise the complex adaptive system that is society will react to the ruling.  
This notion is similar to Lucas’s famous critique (Lucas, 1976) for macroeconomic policy.  
When applied to this setting, it suggests that even if judges faced no knowledge problem 
regarding the determination of the optimal rule given the datum of behavior under the current 
rule, they still face difficulties in predicting how individuals will react to the new purportedly 
better rule.   
 
IV.  Spontaneous Order Economics and Agent-Based Modeling  
 
 Spontaneous orders are also known as complex adaptive systems in the artificial 
intelligence and computational economics literatures.  Complex systems are composed of 
interacting agents that exhibit emergent properties (Tesfatsion, 2006, p.836).  A system is 
complex if it is composed of interacting units and exhibits emergent properties that cannot 
simply be deduced from aggregating the system’s components and emergent properties are those 
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“properties arising from the interactions of the units that are not properties of the individual units 
themselves (p.836).”  Further, a compex adaptive system is “a complex system that includes 
goal-directed units, i.e. units that are reactive and that direct at least some of their reactions 
towards the achievement of built-in (or evolved) goals (p.837).”  Agent-based models, properly 
constructed, are themselves complex adaptive systems in that goal-directed agents interact to 
exhibit emergent properties.    Thus, to the extent that phenomena exhibit complexity, agent 
based modeling represents a potential tool to facilitate the development of an invisible hand 
explanation of such phenomena.   
 In the present case the emergent object is the implicit price of a particular behavior and is 
the result of the complex process of interactions of individuals.  These individuals do not set out 
to minimize the social costs of accidents, they simply select courses of action on the basis of 
their subjectively valued ends and their perception of the means available to achieve them.  
Researchers working in the fields of Agent-Based Modeling and various facets of simulation 
study inform this analysis, but it is also heavily influenced by numerous scholars of the Austrian 
School, particularly their contributions to the theory of the spontaneous order.  As such, I attempt 
to show that agent-based simulation, appropriately applied, can be a useful tool for all scholars 
who study both market and non-market processes. 
 Boettke and Leeson (2002) offer an outline of the core tenants of how the Austrian school 
of economics frames its theorizing.  While many of the tenants have been (at least superficially) 
absorbed into neoclassical economics to some degree, taken together, they outline the basic 
methodology and substance of Austrian economics.  The three core methodological tenants are 
methodological individualism, subjectivism, and the notion of the market as a process (Boettke, 
1994).  Austrian theorists, perhaps more than many other economists embrace the notion of the 
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market as a process through which the subjective demands of consumers are met with the scarce 
resources available.  The fact that process, individual choice under uncertainty, and subjectivism 
are in the foreground of their analyses has led the scholars following this tradition to turn their 
attention to the coordinating effects of entrepreneurship, money, and social institutions that 
enable individuals to better cope with uncertainty. 
Hayek dedicated the vast majority of his life’s work elucidating the intricacies of 
spontaneous order.  According to him, order is achieved when the individuals in a society adjust 
their behavior such that accurate expectations might be formed regarding their future conduct 
(Hayek, 1973, p.36).  The price mechanism is one social institution responsible for enabling 
individuals to pursue and achieve coordination of consumption and production plans in a 
decentralized manner.  The division of labor is a grown order in which individuals pursue their 
own goals and are able to coordinate their behavior by sending, receiving, and interpreting price 
signals communicated as a result of their participation in the market.  Alternatively, an 
organization is a made order, where relationships are formed exogenously and information flows 
through consciously developed channels (Hayek, 1973, p.37).  In organizations, subordinate 
units carry out the plans of superior units and execute only the tasks assigned them.  
 The quintessential organization is a military unit.  The members of the organization 
constantly look for guidance from their leader, as they are rarely delegated the authority to make 
decisions based purely on their local knowledge.  Rather, they feed this local knowledge up the 
chain-of-command so that the commander may make his decision based on the aggregation of all 
the subordinate knowledge.  The nature of organizational decision making and the concomitant 
limitations of the human mind’s ability to process information place significant constraints on 
the complexity of organizations and their ability to adapt to rapidly changing situations.  In an 
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organization, order is maintained by the unitary action of the leader and the alacrity with which 
his commands are executed. 
 Order is grown endogenously in a spontaneous order as individuals adhere to rules of 
conduct on the basis of particular information of time and place (Hayek, 1973, p.37).  Outcomes 
emerge as result of purposive action on the part of agents, rather than the result of the design of 
any one particular mind.  Hayek argues that it is the nature of the rules that govern individual 
interaction that determine whether order is grown, made, or achieved at all.  While the rules that 
govern an organization tend to be concrete and provide relatively specific instructions to specific 
individuals with the intent of accomplishing a stated goal of the organization, the rules that 
govern a spontaneous order are abstract, purposeless in the sense that particular collective 
outcomes are not pursued, and equally applicable to all individuals.  Such rules enable 
individuals to make the most appropriate use of their specific knowledge of time and place while 
enabling order to emerge spontaneously. 
 While agent-based simulation, properly employed, as a method appears capable of 
complementing Hayek’s spontaneous order economics, there are certain aspects of the body of 
Austrian work that may not be as accommodating.  For instance, it would appear that the extreme 
apriorism of praxeology as a method of inquiry should cause Austrians to reject agent-based 
modeling as too empirically oriented and arbitrary.  However, I intend to show that most of the 
apparent differences can be adequately resolved.   
 It is difficult to argue that agent-based modeling is as rigorous as the demanding 
methodological constraints of praxeology.  Praxeology begins with the action axiom that states 
that human beings act to remove a certain felt uneasiness (Mises, 1996; Rothbard, 1997).  This 
axiom is held to be true a priori.  Any theories deduced from the axiom are held to be true with 
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didactic certainty, as long as the chain of logical reasoning is valid.  Certain postulates may also 
be added, such as the notion that individuals perceive a disutility of labor, which change only the 
domain under which the resultant theories are operative.  Thus, any theories derived from such a 
postulate are held to be true, but only in those instances where (ceteris perabis) leisure is 
preferred to labor.    
 Agent-based models are representations of particular sets of assumptions instantiated in 
computer code.  Each simulation run is a realization of the chain of deductions based on the set 
of assumptions, or as Epstein (2006) notes, every simulation replication is essentially a 
sufficiency theorem.  Upon completion of an experimental design, the researcher uses inductive 
techniques and statistical analysis to choose among the population of candidate theories that the 
simulation has produced.  While this process of induction is not necessarily of the same character 
as the scientistic empiricism that Austrians tend to criticize and seek to avoid with aprioristic 
techniques, it is possible a model may produce competing theories.  The criteria developed to 
select between competing theories would not be immune from the arbitrary opinions of the 
researcher and thereby limit the theory’s universality.  However, it does represent a step in the 
direction of greater realism relative to the neoclassical framework.  And, while the conclusions 
arrived at would not necessarily be true with didactic certainty, the goal of such research should 
be to achieve pattern predictions and explanation of principles rather than universal laws.   
 A computer model, such as an agent-based simulation, must be built upon much narrower 
assumptions than the action axiom.  As such, it is necessary to make arbitrary decisions 
regarding the assumptions that govern agents’ behavior.  For instance, in their Sugarscape model, 
Epstein and Axtell (1996) found it necessary to make assumptions regarding the particular 
characteristics of the agents’ motivation for collecting and consuming sugar.  Among the infinite 
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number of mechanisms to govern agent behavior, one must be chosen and instantiated in the 
model.  So, a critic might argue that the conclusions arrived at in the Sugarscape study are only 
valid for humans that eat only sugar and have significantly restricted vision, etc.  However, that 
charge misses the point of a simulation study of simply gaining an understanding of the complex 
mechanism under examination. 
 Mises developed his methodology to study praxeology in an attempt to craft a universal 
theory of human action independent of time and place.  As such, it was necessary to purge any ad 
hoc or contingent elements from the framework, since the presence of arbitrary premises would 
ultimately limit the application of the theory.  Arbitrary designs might creep into the 
development of an agent-based model, and thus limit its application to only that domain in which 
the peculiar notion is operational.   However, it is important to note that there is much more to 
good economic theorizing than praxeology.  After all, as Lavoie (1994) states, “doing economics 
in an Austrian way is tracing systemic (spontaneous order) patterns of events to the 
(subjectively) meaningful purposes of (individual) human actors (p.56; parentheticals in the 
original).”  As such, I intend to show that agent-based simulation is consistent with much of the 
rest of Austrian economics.   
 Mises recognized that the science of human action has a theoretical and a historic aspect 
(Mises, 2003; 2006).  Properly understood, theory is a tool that the student of human action 
employs in order to make sense of history.  The employment of conjectural history, is a 
technique in which the theorist develops historically contingent theory.  When conducting 
conjectural history, reference is made to specific institutions, policies, or other arrangements that 
were present in reality at the time.   
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Such conjectural histories therefore make use of the ideal-type constructs (these 
constructs, to be sure, never refer to ideal-typical people, but only to ideal-type 
objects or consequences of action), although their truth follows apodictically 
where all the real-life equivalents of the specified ideal-types are present in a 
given historical circumstances.  Causal-genetic or “evolutionary” theories such as 
Menger’s theory of the origin of money fall into this category of conjectural 
history (Selgin, 1988, p.27; emphasis his). 
 
Theory developed in this manner is highly contingent on the underlying assumptions, but it is 
indispensable to the analysis of economic phenomena that appear in reality.  Agent based 
simulation can assist researchers in the conduct of conjectural history by facilitating the 
examination of complex processes.  It is capable of employing ideal-types, both agents and 
institutions, and ultimately assists the researcher in providing a genetic-causal explanation of 
social phenomena.   
 In his discussion of the use of ideal types in economics, Koppl (1994a) notes that ideal 
types are “intelligible” representations of actions or actors (p.72).  He goes on to explain that the 
generality of an argument based on the use of ideal types depends upon the anonymity of the 
ideal type used.  “The anonymity of a personal ideal type is the degree to which it is empty of 
particular content (p.73).”   Thus, the more anonomously the agents inhabiting artificial societies 
are developed, while remaining recognizable to human beings as actors, the more effective will 
be their employment as ideal types.   
 In Cowan (1994) and Cowan and Rizzo (1996), the authors elucidate the importance of 
the notion of causation in economic analysis.   The genetic-causal approach they outline 
embraces the notion that the cause of an outcome “creates a unidirectional process the outcome 
of which is the effect (1996, p.274).”  Purposive human behavior, traced back to the tastes and 
expectations of individuals, are the endogeneous causes of these outcomes.  Typical mainstream 
equilibrium economics eschews notions of causations.  After all, in order for a cause to originate, 
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a change must occur, but change is essentially precluded in the equilibrium framework.  Agent-
based modeling is uniquely suited to illuminate these complicated chains of causation that result 
in emergent unintended outcomes.  The models are capable of providing researchers with 
comprehensive information regarding the state of each and every individual agent in the 
population, which enables the researcher to follow chains of causation from their inception to 
their ultimate end.  However, it should be stressed that such endeavors are truly only fruitful if 
they lead to greater understanding of actual processes.   
 Cowen and Rizzo (1996, p.301) borrow what Bunge (1960, p.401) terms as a poistem, or 
“a system of interrelated qualities or variables.”  They demonstrate that certain mainstream 
analyses conclude in a poistem, simply because the answer is mathematically derived and lacks 
any notion of asymmetrical causation.  See Seagren (2009, especially Ch 5) for a more thorough 
analysis of this concept and how it applies to neoclassical law and economics models.  These 
models may be used to derive optimal agent behavior given a particular liability rule, however, 
they lack a description of the process by which individual, self interested agents are provided the 
appropriate incentives that induce socially optimal behavior.  If individuals’ response functions 
are sufficiently interdependent, then achieving individual maxima may not achieve the social 
optimal.  I demonstrate in the next section that an agent-based model that implements an 
evolutionary algorithm for individual agent strategy selection overcomes this quandary.  Such a 
model embraces the genetic-causal tradition to which Austrians have contributed and I argue that 
it provides a reasonable example of how an agent-based model may contribute to the Austrian 
perspective of law and economics.     
 It is difficult in the extreme to imbue artificial agents with the full character and quality 
of purposive human action.  The inability to capture the open-endedness of how humans manage 
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their subjective means-ends framework is a shortcoming that agent-based simulation as a method 
may never fully overcome.  To the extent that the agents in the model capture relevant 
characteristics of the action axiom, then the more effective the simulation model is bound to be 
in illuminating the phenomena under consideration.  While it is true that the artificial societies 
depicted in agent-based models lack the complexity and richness of human society, and the 
agents that populate these virtual worlds lack the intelligence of human beings, it is also true that 
the agents’ relative ability to act within their society might be comparable (Lavoie, 1994b, 
p.554).  Virtual agents certainly are not as creative or innovative as the individuals they mean to 
portray, but relative to their world, they could be considered creative as they are capable of 
learning from experience and adopting courses of actions as a result of trial and error (Lavoie, 
1994b, p.554).  Thus, artificial agents are subject to the criticism that they are not and perhaps 
never will be capable of achieving the intelligence and creativity of human beings, but they are 
capable of innovation relative to the worlds they inhabit.  
 Mises makes clear that “specific method of economics is the method of imaginary 
constructions (1996, p.236).”  Of course some imaginary constructions are more useful than 
others when it comes to promoting the understanding of social phenomena.  In this section I have 
argued that agent-based modeling can assist in the development of such imaginary constructions.  
To date, most Austrians have refrained from exploiting the capabilities inherent in agent-based 
modeling.  However, there have been scholars that have recognized its potential contribution.   
Lavoie notes that “Agent based simulation may be a useful way to expand the Austrian School’s 
set of expositional tools (Lavoie, 1994b, p.549).”  He, correctly I believe, points out that “The 
theorist might use visualization of dynamic market processes to help think through the logic of 
the dynamics (p.552).”  Agent-based simulation provides the theorist with a means to elucidate 
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the dynamic processes of the target phenomena and lead her to develop a meaningful genetic-
causal explanation of its emergence.   
 
V.  An Example of Agent-Based Modeling and Economic Analysis of the Law 
 
 Imagine a society known as Eggtopia.  The inhabitants are human beings, and are just 
like any other human beings in their ability to use their senses to collect information about their 
environment, as well as the ability to take action on the basis of that information in conjunction 
with their subjective valuation of the relative benefits of means and ends.  In addition, these 
individuals possess the same physical attributes as any other human being such as visual acuity, 
strength, ability to move, etc.  The members of Eggtopian society enjoy access to relatively free 
markets and a moderately liberal order based on private property and freedom of contract.  
Among other services, there exists a civil court system in which parties resolve private disputes 
relating to contracts, property, and torts.  In many respects, Eggtopian society is 
indistinguishable from nearly any other in the Western world.   
 A significant source of income in the Eggtopian economy is based on the sale of eggs and 
egg products.  These eggs are scarce, extremely fragile, and incredibly valuable, thus a large 
proportion of Eggtopians are employed in their collection.  Unfortunately, for all their skill and 
talent, the process of searching for eggs, extracting them from the ground, and storing them 
securely is fraught with danger.  In their haste to collect as many eggs as possible, accidents 
between Eggtopians occur with great frequency and typically destroys any eggs the victim was 
carrying.  When an accident occurs, the parties to the accident decide upon how to proceed 
pursuant to the relevant accident law and pertinent facts of the case at hand.  In this sense, 
Eggtopians face a challenge similar to that of many members of this society.  That is, engaging 
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in productive activity also brings with it distinct risk of accidental damage to self or property.  
Changing behavior along margins that improve productivity, such as speed of travel, also may 
increase the possibility of an accident occurring.   
 The fictional Eggtopian society is rather stylized concerning the circumstances 
surrounding the egg collection and production, but is still recognizable enough to reality to glean 
insights common to individuals’ behaviors regarding accidents.  The general keys to analysis of 
accidents in the virtual world of the model are no different than analyzing accidents in the real 
word.  In reality, accidents typically occur while both parties are engaged in otherwise 
productive behavior.  In the course of their behavior, individuals may take measures that reduce 
the likelihood of an accident occurring, however, these activities may simultaneously inhibit 
productive behavior, i.e. if the driver of a delivery truck were to maintain a relatively slower 
speed, it may reduce the probability of an accident, but it also increases the time it takes to 
transport the goods she is hauling.  In fact, the idea is so general as to apply to almost any 
productive, yet risky, endeavor. 
 The intent of this mental construct is to serve as the target of an economic analysis of 
accident law.  Since Eggtopia is a figment of the author’s imagination (and now the reader’s), no 
empirical data, case law, or historical record exists that describe in detail the activities of its 
inhabitants.  The agent-based computational model provides the mechanism with which data are 
generated to test the effectiveness of various approaches to economic analysis of accident law.  
Part of the reason for the relative dearth of empirical law and economics studies is the difficulty 
of obtaining data conducive to analysis and testing.  In this case, agent-based modeling 
overcomes this challenge. 
A.  The Model: An Artificial Implementation of Eggtopia  
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 The virtual model of Eggtopia is comprised of a two-dimensional torus grid that is rather 
densely populated with both heterogeneous agents and eggs.  An agent’s strategy consists of his 
egg carrying capacity, visual range, and speed of movement.  Upon locating an egg, the agent 
picks it up and carries it with him while continuing his search for additional eggs.  Agents are 
limited in their ability to simultaneously carry multiple eggs and upon reaching their maximum 
capacities they must return “home” to unload their collection before resuming their search1.  In 
the course of maneuvering through their environment, agents occasionally collide with one 
another.  When agents collide, the eggs the victim was carrying are destroyed.  Different tort 
rules are immediately employed to adjudicate the disputes the arise surrounding the aftermath of 
these accidents.  
 The agents that populate the model single-mindedly pursue the goal of collecting eggs.  
They possess no explicit choice algorithm nor do they form expectations regarding the future.  
One might say that if they possess a utility function at all, it is a lexicographic preference for 
eggs to the exclusion of all other goods, to include leisure, safety, etc.  Modeling such zero 
intelligence agents has precedence in the computational and behavioral finance literature.  In an 
influential article, Gode and Sunder (1993) utilized what they termed zero intelligence traders to 
examine the institutional effects of particular auction rules.  See Duffy (2006) for a 
comprehensive survey and assessment of this literature.   
 While Gode and Sunder’s agents selected their bids randomly, there is no randomness 
when it comes to an agent’s choice in this model.  That the agent pursues the collection of eggs is 
given, however, agents do select the strategy to carry out that end.  While such an algorithm is 
perhaps a poor description of human action, it does provide a blank slate of sorts to allow for all 
 
1 For simplicity, the agent’s initial position at the beginning of the simulation run is deemed its home position.   
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sorts of behavior that may depart from traditional notions of rationality and it emphasizes the 
institution’s role in guiding behavior, as opposed to relying on notions of rationality or a 
particular level of intelligence.   
B.  Evolution of Behavior 
 This model relaxes certain assumptions that provide the foundation for neoclassical 
economic models which Axtell (2007, pp.106-108) characterizes as the neoclassical “sweet 
spot.”  The sweet spot consists of assumptions of agent rationality and homogeneity, as well as 
non-interaction and equilibrium, necessary to achieve the researchers’ desired performance of the 
model in terms of formality, generality, and tractability.  The neoclassical theory is one attempt 
to make sense of the spontaneous order that individuals collectively form when interacting with 
tort law as an institution, interacting with other agents, and interacting with their environment.  
This order is ultimately the subject of economic analysis of tort law.  Spontaneous order 
economics in general and agent-based computational modeling in particular embraces the 
dynamic nature of this order and allows the researcher to trace emergent macro-level phenomena 
through the genetic-causal chain of interactions to its origin in individual behavior.     
 Employing agents that adapt their behavior in an evolutionary manner necessarily 
requires heterogeneous characteristics and a decision-making process that is much less ambitious 
than neoclassical rationality.  Modeling agent behavior in this manner acknowledges that 
Eggtopians confront a significant challenge concerning how to best employ their skills in pursuit 
of egg collection since, contrary to neoclassical agents, they lack the information required to 
systematically identify and implement an unambiguous globally optimal strategy.  While most 
neoclassical models differentiate between injurers and victims, the flexibility of agent based 
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modeling allows us to jettison this artificial dichotomy because in reality individuals often do not 
know when or if they will cause or be the victim of an accident. 
 Agents select from a wide array of parameter combinations, as all of their individual 
attributes may vary between 1 and 33.  The task placed before each agent is daunting.  
Individuals must select the strategy that, given all other agents strategies and behavior, will 
improve or at least maintain their current level of income over the course of a generation.  
However, they have exactly 333 or 35,937 strategies from which to choose.  Their choice is 
based on the perceived effectiveness of their current strategy and their most recent reasonably 
successful strategy.  As opposed to the elegant continuous, twice differentiable field upon which 
neoclassical agents are assumed to maximize their utility, these agents are, more realistically, 
confronted with an enormous combinatoric problem.   
 Potts (2000) provides an analysis of the shortcomings inherent in basing a model of 
individual decision-making on a mathematical field and illustrates how it ultimately assumes an 
impossible level of knowledge concerning the state of the world on the part of the individual.  
The interconnectedness of the elements of the field, that is, the continuous function in R space, 
implies that the individual has at his disposal a complete understanding of the world and is easily 
able to identify and implement an optimal response.  Potts asserts that the economic space upon 
which individuals operate is better perceived as a less than fully connected set of elements.  The 
individual’s task is to explore this space by experimenting with various combinations of 
elements in order to discover the means which best serve her ends.  This combinatoric problem 
goes beyond the largely artificial necessity of only choosing integer values for strategy 
parameters, rather it implies massive amounts of uncertainty in the agent’s choice due to a 
paucity of information concerning the relative values of various strategic choices.     
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 Agents are allowed to change their strategies at particular intervals.  The algorithm 
employed contains aspects of trial and error, as well as hill-climbing and satisficing.  Upon 
completion of each generation of 500 timesteps, each agent examines the success of her current 
strategy in terms of wealth.  Let us assume that the agent has employed her incumbent strategy, 
which simply means that strategy which has proven successful in the recent past.  If her current 
wealth exceeds that from the previous generation, meaning that the incumbent strategy has 
succeeded again in bettering her condition, it will remain her incumbent strategy and she will 
employ it in the next generation.  This is the satisficing characteristic, in that the agent is 
satisfied with a relatively well performing strategy and does not seek to “fix what is not broken.”  
See Brenner (2006, pp.913-4) for a description of satisficing strategies, and see Nelson and 
Winter (1976) for a well known and successful implementation in terms profit seeking firms.  
If the agent’s current wealth is less than that observed in her previous generation, that is, 
if the incumbent strategy does not succeed in improving her condition, she will select a candidate 
strategy and employ it in the next generation.  This is the hill-climbing and the trial and error 
characteristic of the algorithm.  Candidate strategies are selected with equal probability from the 
set of neighbors of the current strategy.  In the current implementation, neighbors are all 
strategies whose parameters are no more than +/- 2 levels from the current one.  This means that 
most strategies have 53, or 125, neighbors including itself.   
At the end of the next generation, the candidate strategy’s success is measured against the 
level of wealth the incumbent strategy garnered the last time it was employed.  If the candidate 
strategy yields greater wealth, it is deemed the new incumbent strategy and employed in the next 
generation.  If the candidate strategy’s performance is less than that of the incumbent, then the 
incumbent remains as such and is employed in the next generation.  Thus, the upper level of the 
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model is a classic evolutionary process in which the agents adapt their strategies or attributes 
according to the strategies and attributes that have exhibited success in that particular generation, 
or stage, of the model.   
C.  Results 
 
 In this section I report a few of the more interesting results of the initial analysis of the 
model.  The following is not intended to be the final word on any subject; rather it is to identify a 
path for future research that appears promising.  The agents in the model form a complex 
adaptive system with many characteristics that maintain a state of flux.  Aggregate wealth 
appears to exhibit a transient state for a period of time before settling into a steady state.  In Law 
and Kelton’s (2000, p.502) terminology, this is a nonterminating simulation and aggregate 
wealth is a steady state parameter.  In order to appropriately analyze the steady state behavior, a 
run time must be selected of sufficient length for the system to not only enter steady state but to 
collect a substantial sample of steady state data as well.  I use Welch’s Method to determine 
when steady state is achieved (Law and Kelton, 2004, pp.520-525) and conclude that for all 
scenarios, this occurs by 350,000 timesteps.  I then use the replication/deletion method (Law and 
Kelton, 2004, pp.525-6) to measure the level of steady state parameters of interest.  Each 
replication is run for 400k timesteps and all data for time < 350k is neglected.  In all subsequent 
scenarios, the model is run for 800 generations, or 400,000 timesteps.  All data is considered for 
the analysis of transient variables, but only data after 350k timesteps is considered for steady 
state variables.  In order to economize on time and computer space, only the results of every 10th 
generation are output and thus available for analysis.  In all instances, the scenario where 
Eggtopia is inhabited by 100 agents in search of 1,000 eggs is examined.  Each scenario is tested 
between 10 to 30 replications each in order to shrink confidence intervals sufficiently to 
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approach statistically significant results.  However, throughout the analysis emphasis is placed 
on the practical significance of various outcomes.   
 Consistent with typical neoclassical analysis, the evolutionary approach is capable of 
differentiating among any of several liability rules and identifying the superior performing rule.  
In the present case the measure of effectiveness is aggregate wealth, but alternative metrics are 
imaginable.  The framework allows for the researcher to actually employ the various liability 
rules in artificial societies to examine the rules’ effects directly, as opposed to only analyzing the 
effects of a rule of no-liability and deducing the effects of subsequent rules.  A number of other 
questions concerning the distribution of wealth, the distribution of strategies, individuals’ steady 
state behavior, and transient behavior is examined as well. 
Identifying the Wealth Maximizing Rule 
 The rules of strict liability, no liability, and negligence, where due care is defined in 
terms of various levels of each strategy parameter, are all examined.  Table 1 provides an overall 
comparison of the best performing tort rules.  For each of five liability rules, agents’ per capita 
wealth is measured over the course of a generation.  The negligence rules shown are the best 
rules for each parameter.  For example, the best performing negligence rule on the basis of speed 
is one where due care is defined as speed > 9.2  The rule of no liability achieves the highest per 
capita wealth, while strict liability performs relatively poorly.  The difference between strict 
liability and all other rules is not only highly statistically significant, but is of practical 
significance as well.  Per capita losses and accidents are also shown for each rule as well as 
compensation and strategy changes.  Per capita compensation is the average amount of wealth 
each agent transfers as a result of a dispute over the course of a generation.   
 
2 Rules where due care is defined in terms of speed > 17 and 25, as well as speed < 9, 17, 25 were considered. 
 
 
Table 1.  Overall Comparison of Tort Rules. 3 
None Strict Vision Capacity Speed
due care n/a n/a < 25 < 25 > 9
avg wealth 223.9 36.8 217.7 217.7 220.5
avg losses 128.4 256.3 133.3 124.3 131.5
avg accidents 40.3 26.0 38.4 42.9 42.1
avg compensation 0.0 256.3 4.0 1.8 0.5
avg strategy changes 161.96 172.32 153.38 157.70 160.58
( 100 , 1000 )
Liability Negligence                 due care in terms of
 
 
 The evolutionary perspective provides a richer understanding of the complexities of 
Eggtopian society because, as we have shown, it is possible to demonstrate from a genetic-causal 
standpoint the process through which a system generates particular steady-state outcomes.  There 
is no confusion regarding whether it is appropriate to optimize individual, or social, outcomes, as 
it is when employing the poistem that is the neoclassical model (see Seagren, 2009, esp Ch 5).  
Unraveling the sweet spot and enabling heterogeneous agents to pursue their own interests on the 
basis of their local knowledge is sufficient to achieve a steady state condition for each of the 
liability rules under investigation.  The agents employ a simple satisficing algorithm with limited 
neighborhood search in pursuit of their own well-being, to the exclusion of all other concerns.  
Agent interaction tends to drive social wealth asymptotically to the vicinity of the maximum 
achievable for a given liability rule and is an unintended, though seemingly beneficial, 
consequence of agent behavior.   
 These results, namely that strict liability performs poorly relative to other negligence 
rules and even no liability rule would seem to militate against Rizzo’s argument that in a world 
of flux, the rule of strict liability is superior.  However, Rizzo’s thesis is that given an uncertain 
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3 Differences between all pairs are statistically significant with the exception of the negligence rules for vision and 
capacity.  Metrics shown are per capita averaged over all replications.  
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world of flux, the rule of strict liability provides an institutionally efficient rule by reducing 
uncertainty as to how the courts will handle disputes.  Given the relative ex ante certainty of the 
rule of strict liability, individuals are better able to plan their activities and assess the 
consequences of risky behavior.  This effect is magnified in a world of technological change that 
effects relationships in unimaginable ways.  Since the present version of the model includes 
neither agent expectations nor a mechanism for technological change, these results should serve 
to simply inform this debate rather than provide weight to either side.  In this stage of its 
development, the model may be considered a foil.  Adding time and process to the analysis is not 
sufficient to conclude that strict liability is superior to negligence rule in a dynamic society.   
 
Macro-Steady State, Micro-Turbulence 
 The previous section outlined the relative performance of various liability regimes in 
terms of average wealth achieved during steady state as a measure of effectiveness.  Steady-state 
is determined to have arrived when aggregate wealth ceases to vary significantly with time.  One 
of the benefits of the agent-based modeling approach to the analysis of the current problem is the 
ability to examine the behavior of the entire distribution of agents.  While the macro-level 
outcome of time-invariant aggregate wealth is the result of the interaction of heterogeneous 
agents and their environment, it is not obvious what individual behavior is necessary to achieve 
it.  Agent based modeling enables us to answer this question. 
 If it were the case that individual equilibrium is a necessary condition for system level 
steady-state, we would expect that agents would decrease the frequency with which they change 
their strategies as the system achieves equilibrium, at or around 350k timesteps.  Figure 1 is a 
graph of average agent strategy changes through time, with separate lines depicting the effects of 
a number of different liability regimes.  As the graph indicates, there is no reduction in the 
frequency of strategy selection upon entering steady state.  That is, agents do not seem to settle 
on a particular strategy that is a robust response to the strategies employed by all of the other 
agents.  Agents continue to grope for strategies as a means to improve upon the outcomes they 
currently experience. 
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 While we establish that agents continue to change their strategies in light of their attempt 
to respond to an ever changing world, it is not clear whether this flux also affects the agents’ 
outcomes that ultimately obtain.  Figure 2 outlines the how widely agents’ outcomes in terms of 
wealth vary during steady state.  Recall that steady state is achieved at approximately 350k 
timesteps.   
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4 The onset of system-level steady state appears to have no effect on the rate at which individual agents change their 
strategies. 
Average Agent Quintile Mobility in Steady State
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If agents’ outcomes achieved steady-state commensurate with that of the macro-level steady 
state, we would expect that agents that appear in a given quintile at the onset of steady state 
would remain there throughout.  Indeed, a charitable expectation would be for most agents to 
appear in no more than two different quintiles.  However, as the figure indicates, between 70% 
and 96% of agents appear in three or more quintiles throughout steady state, depending upon the 
liability rule in effect.  The most variable outcomes result under the rule of strict liability, where 
approximately 96% of agents experience significant fluctuations in their success relative to other 
agents even while the system is in steady state.  This result is counterintuitive in that one would 
expect that individual stability or “equilibrium” would be a necessary condition for system level 
stability. 
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5 Once system-level steady state is achieved, the vast majority of agents still experience significant variance in the 
success of their selected strategies, as evidenced by the fact that they may find themselves in three or more different 
income quintiles during the given timeframe.  As indicated, this result is robust across liability rules.   
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 It is fortunate that the model achieves a steady state in terms of an important aggregate 
variable such as total wealth and enables a straight-forward method to compare different liability 
regimes.  Whether this system we have created would behave in this manner was a question that 
could only be answered empirically.  Furthermore, while the aggregate system may achieve a 
pattern of steady state behavior, this section demonstrates that the agents do not exhibit behavior 
recognizable as equilibrium.  This finding tends to demonstrate the dangers of representative 
agent theorizing.  Randomly selecting an agent would reveal an individual who continues to 
grope for the appropriate strategy in the face of a constantly changing environment.   
Examining Population Distributions 
 A drawback of representative agent theorizing is that it is subject to untold error via 
expected value propagation and is blind to the effects of interactions between different agents, 
especially those who find themselves in the tails of their distributions.  The more diverse a 
population, the more their individualized subjectivist views differ in light of their local 
knowledge of time and place, the more problematic is a representative agent approach.  Indeed, 
one of the most compelling aspects of agent-based modeling and its ability to enable the 
researcher to unravel the neoclassical sweet spot is that it enables analysis of the entire 
population of agents, rather than reducing all behavior, and all interactions, into the activities of a 
single representative agent.    
 A major theoretical conclusion of neoclassical analysis is that in cases of joint care, that 
is when it is efficient for both the injurer and victim to exercise some level of care, neither the 
rules of no liability nor strict liability are efficient.  Under no liability, since injurers are not 
forced to internalize the damage from the accidents they cause, they engage in an insufficiently 
low level of care.  Similarly, under strict liability, victims are relieved from responsibility for 
34 
their actions and know that they will be fully compensated for any losses they may suffer in any 
accident, no matter the circumstances, so they too will engage in insufficiently low levels of care 
(Shavell, 1987). 
 It is not necessarily obvious how this conclusion regarding inefficient behavior scales up 
to a large population of heterogeneous agents.  It may be the case that in the aggregate, injurers 
under a rule of no liability select lower levels of care on average and thus reduce the overall 
wealth in society by destroying an inefficiently large amount in accidents.  Are the wealthiest 
(most successful) injurers those that cast caution to the wind and charge around Eggtopia in 
search of eggs, without regard to the accidents they are causing and the wealth they are 
destroying?  Do victims under a rule of strict liability respond to their unaccountable status with 
similar disregard for the (social) consequences of their actions? 
 Figure 3 displays the steady state average accident rates (per generation) for each of 
several liability regimes separated by wealth quintile.  A general inverse relationship between 
wealth quintile and accident rate is clearly discernable.  In fact, agents in the highest wealth 
quintile cause the fewest accidents for each of the liability regimes considered.  This effect is 
both statistically and practically significant for the rule of no liability, as well as the others.   
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 Thus, the agent based approach enables us to unravel the sweet spot and examine 
questions that static equilibrium methods are unable to deal appropriately.  Under either liability 
rule, it appears that the wealthiest agents are not the wealthiest because they successfully take 
advantage of the fact that the rule relieves them of financial responsibility of their actions, rather 
they are wealthy because they select those strategies that are most productive.  This is another 
example of how this approach opens new doors for examining social phenomena more closely 
and inspires new questions to pursue.  
 
Out of Equilibrium Dynamics 
 Another compelling feature of the evolutionary approach is that it provides the researcher 
with the ability to analyze out of equilibrium behavior.  Rather than assert the existence of 
equilibrium and then deduce the conditions that must be present in order to sustain it, this 
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6 For all rules shown, agents in the top of the income distribution cause the fewest accidents.  Liability rules were 
chosen on the basis of providing a wide range of performance in terms of expected wealth.   
approach begins from out of equilibrium conditions and enables analysis of the process through 
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 Figure 4 is a depiction of the transient behavior of the system for both no liability (upper 
panels) and strict liability (lower panels).  The panels on the left-hand side show the average 
wealth of agents in the 1st, 3rd, and 5th quintiles, and the panels on the right show the strategy 
changes over time for the top and bottom quintiles.  The effect of the different rules on the 
relative wealth of the different quintiles is startling.  While the average wealth levels for the 
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different quintiles under no liability simultaneously approach their asymptotes, under strict 
liability, the bottom quintile is highly variable and is always negative. 
 A possible explanation of this behavior is evident upon examining the right-hand panels.  
Under the no liability rule, agents in the top quintile locate the productive regions of the strategy 
space within approximately 400 generations or 200k timesteps.  In contrast, all of the agents 
under strict liability seem to be concentrated around the middle of the strategy space, which is 
consistent with the notion that the agents are unable to reliably ascertain the correct strategy 
selection from their experiences.  
 In the neoclassical framework, agent rationality and perfect information essentially rule 
out negligent behavior by definition under most negligence rules.  Agents know that if they fail 
to exercise care they will bear the full costs of accidents they cause, so it is rational to exercise 
the level of care that meets the legal standard and nothing more.  The persistent presence of 
negligent injurers is indicative of an institutional failure to provide appropriate incentives to 
agents to engage in non-negligent behavior.  However, it could also mean that individuals select 
negligent strategies because it is profitable for them to do so despite bearing liability for 
accidents.  Figure 5 is a graph of the average number of negligent agents through time for several 
negligence rules where due care is defined in terms of speed.  The top three speed based rules 
(spd_nlt_09, spd_nlt_17, and spd_NMT_25)7 according to average wealth also tend to guide 
agents to attain non-negligent strategies.  The other regimes considered fail to rid society of 
negligent behavior.  Whether some number of negligent agents are present in the wealth 
maximizing scenario is an empirical matter, but one that Figure 5 begins to address.   
 
 
7 The convention is neg_spd_nlt_09 identifies a negligence rule where due care is defined as speed not less than 9.  
Likewise, neg_spd_NMT_25 identifies a negligence rule where due care is defined as speed not more than 25. 
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It appears the suboptimal negligence rules are possibly so due to their inability to provide agents 
with sufficient incentives to behave non-negligently.  In cases where due care is improperly set, 
the incentives seem to be such that some agents are not guided to engage in non-negligent 
behavior.  In contrast, typical neoclassical analysis concludes the an excessive negligence rule 
results in excessive care on the part of the injurer. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 In this paper, we have demonstrated that the agent-based modeling approach is able to 
adjudicate between numerous liability rules and determine the rule or set of rules that achieve a 
particular performance standard in regards to any number of effectiveness measures.  The 
evolutionary choice algorithm that agents employ to select their strategies drives the complex 
adaptive system that is the artificial society to eventually achieve an institutionally contingent 
social wealth maximizing steady state.  The individual behavior also ultimately provides a 
38 
39 
genetic-causal explanation for the observed macro-phenomena.  Agents, in diligent pursuit of 
ever more eggs, search for strategies that tend to result in higher egg production, and gradually 
push the system to achieve a steady state level that is in the neighborhood of the highest 
achievable under that liability rule.  So, an unintended consequence of the agents’ quest for 
improving their state in life is to raise the aggregate level of wealth in society.  This narrative 
contrasts starkly with the neoclassical version in which a system of deterministic equations is 
optimized, but robust micro-foundations are eschewed.   
 The power of the evolutionary approach is not simply that it provides a genetic- causal 
explanation as a means for differentiating between various liability rules, it is that the approach 
enables the exploration of population dynamics and the close examination of out of equilibrium 
behavior.  Among the realizations this framework yields is the notion that while the aggregate 
system appears to achieve a relatively stable level, the components of the system continue to 
furiously grope around the domain in search of wealth enhancing strategies.  In addition, agents 
may elect to be careful even when the neoclassical theory predicts otherwise, and liability rules 
tend to differ significantly in their ability to rid society of negligent behavior.   
 Finally, this essay also highlights the knowledge problem inherent in the pursuit of 
economic efficiency of judicial decision making.  The fact that this approach arguably provided a 
relatively more consistent and coherent model for the theoretical determination of superior 
liability rules than the neoclassical effort should not be construed as an endorsement of the 
notion that judges should employ agent-based simulation studies to aid their decision making.  In 
fact, this analysis only serves to highlight the enormous informational requirement such pursuits 
place upon judges.  “Optimal” rules only emerged after systematic enumeration and 
experimentation of the rules considered.  Indeed, only a relatively small proportion of all 
40 
possible rules were even considered.  For example, due care could be defined in terms of various 
intervals along the strategy space, or even in terms of combinations of attributes.  Such a 
realization would tend to militate against Posner’s objective version of judges leading the 
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